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MUSIC AS A TEST-CASE 
How could history of science fail to be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowledge 
may legitimately be asked to apply? 
Th. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1970), p. 9. 
I. Introduction 
THE AIM OF THIS PAPER is to inquire what a few selected general theories on 
the progress of science are capable of accomplishing when confronted with a 
particular set of historical data that have never gone into either the making or 
the testing of any metatheory of science. The data utilized in this paper are 
taken from a part of the history of a science that has fairly consistently been 
overlooked by historians of science, namely the science of music. During the 
period I am concerned with - the Scientific Revolution in its first stage - 
certain quantitative aspects of music theory were felt to be no less a legitimate 
part of the scientific enterprise than disciplines we at present ake for granted, 
such as mechanics, optics, astronomy and so on. Yet many of those who 
shaped the Scientific Revolution, men like Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, 
Mersenne, Huygens, Newton, devoted part of their attention to the science of 
music, as natural participants in a tradition that goes back at least to 
Pythagoras, and has never entirely died out; witness contributions to the same 
field by such later luminaries as Euler, D’Alembert, and Helmholtz. 
In my book Quantifying Music. The Science of Music at the First Stage of 
the Scientific Revolution, 1580 - I650 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel)’ I have defined 
the issues involved, and given a detailed account, entirely based on primary 
sources, of the radical transformation the science of music underwent during 
the period covered at the hands of nine particular scientists: Kepler, Stevin, 
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Benedetti, Vincenzo and Galileo Galilei, Mersenne, Beeckman, Descartes and 
Huygens.’ 
The main problem they were all concerned with was the (in essence still 
Pythagorean) problem of consonance. What this was all about will be 
explained presently; here it should be noted that to the legacy of the 
Renaissance belonged one particular theory of consonance - the senario; that 
Kepler invented an account of his own; and that virtually all others either put 
forward or adopted a new explanation of consonance, which I have termed the 
coincidence theory. On the face of it we have here a rather clear-cut case of 
theory replacement: from about 1600 on the senario was universally rejected; 
Kepler’s solution never convinced anyone; the coincidence theory carried the 
day for quite some time to come. What makes the historical case 
philosophically interesting, however, is that certain formal properties of the 
victorious theory (in particular its failure to solve any of the core problems of 
consonance it was supposed to provide the solution for) seem to defy many, if 
not all, current theoretical accounts of how theory replacement comes about. 
According to the inductivist account, science grows through the continuous 
expansion of known facts generalized into ever more-embracing theories. 
Popper’s metatheory states that theories are replaced by new ones in case that 
the latter are capable of passing tests the earlier ones fail to stand up to. 
According to Kuhn, theory replacement is part of a revolutionary process; it 
comes about as a consequence of a preceding crisis, and results in a new 
‘paradigm’, or ‘disciplinary matrix’, that is more capable than its predecessor 
of solving current problems - even though anomalies continue to exist. 
Finally, Feyerabend maintains that when more than one theory is available, 
there are no rational criteria for choosing between them: one theory replaces 
another for reasons that cannot possibly derive from external criteria, but 
ultimately come down to matters of taste and fashion. 
In the main body of this paper we shall investigate, first through an 
historical (section 2), and then through a theoretical analysis (section 3), to 
what extent our historical case of theory replacement fits any of these four 
metatheoretical descriptions. 3 What makes such an exercise particularly 
‘Musical theories of some of these have been discussed before by a few historians, notably by D. 
P. Walker, Studies in Musical Science in the Late Renaissance (Leiden, 1978); C. V. Palisca, 
‘Scientific Empiricism in Musical Thought’, in Seventeenfh Century Science and fhe Arts, H. H. 
Rhys, (ed.) (Princeton, 1961); and M. Dickreiter, Der MusiktheoreGker Johannes Kepler (Bern, 
1973). See for a more detailed discussion of the historiographical situation the preface of 
Quanrifying Music (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984). 
‘I refrain from including in this list Lakatos’ ‘methodology of research programs’, since in my 
view it adds little of substance to Popper’s ideas on the increase and decrease of the empirical 
content of theories (cp. K. R. Popper, ‘Replies to my Critics’, in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 
P. A. Schilpp (ed.) (La Salle, Illinois, 1974). pp. 993 - 1013). I also do not think that my broad use 
of the term ‘research program’ further on in this paper has much in common with the Lakatosian 
notion. 
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worthwhile, I think, is that it straddles the borderline between pre-modern and 
modern science. Much more, therefore, was at stake than just the passage 
from one theory to the next: a fundamental shift in scientific standards was 
involved. Thus this period is a vital one for metatheories on the progress of 
science to prove their mettle: their worth is tested by means of data from a 
period when science itself underwent a drastic upheaval. Issues like the 
demarcation of science and non-science; the nature of revolutionary science; 
continuity versus break in scientific progress, and the amount of rationality 
involved in theory replacement thus come to the fore with particular urgency. 
This has in fact been recognized for a long time: witness the frequency with 
which Copernicus and Galileo, in particular, have been invoked to support one 
metatheory or another. In this paper I intend to draw a somewhat different 
conclusion, in that the uniqueness of the Scientific Revolution itself will be 
invoked to account for the overall failure of our four metatheories to fit all the 
facts of our historical case (section 4). 
One side issue, finally, of the theory of consonance that may also be of 
special interest to philosophers is that it provides a rather unexpected 
perspective from which to look at the mind- body problem and its history. 
The perception of light is usually treated as the paradigm case of sense 
perception; yet the way regular vibrations of the air are perceived as sound 
provides a no less valid entrance to the same problem, particularly in the case 
of musical intervals, since these not only represent a very special kind of 
sound, but are also easily quantifiable. To explain why and how they are 
provides us at once with the necessary introduction to the historical part of this 
paper. 
II. The transformation of the science of music at the first stage of the Scientific 
Revolution 
2.1. The problem of consonance before 1600 
The basic problem is very simple. When two arbitrarily chosen musical notes 
are sounded together, the resulting interval will not, generally speaking, be 
perceived as pleasant. Such an aesthetically displeasing interval is called a 
‘dissonance’. In the entire continuum of possible intervals only a very few do 
strike perceiving man as ‘quiet’, ‘restful’, ‘beautiful’. These few intervals are 
called the ‘consonances’, and it is to this defining feature that they owe their 
having functioned throughout history as the ‘building-blocks’ on which 
virtually all of musical composition was based.4 Hence the distinction 
‘Twentieth-century Western music provides one of the few exceptions to this rule. 
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Table 1. 
Interval Unison Octave Fifth Fourth Major third Minor third ,Major sixth Minor sixth 
Ratio I:1 1:2 2~3 3:-l 4:5 5:6 3:5 5:8 
between consonance and dissonance is fundamental to music. Now Pythagor- 
as is credited with the discovery that this fundamental distinction is exactly 
matched by another one. He found experimentally that the consonances can be 
generated by dividing a sounding string into several ratios, all of which are 
made up of a few simple integers. Thus, for instance, the consonance now 
called octave is sounded by a string and its half; hence it is represented by the 
ratio 1:2. Similarly the fifth is given by 2:3. In contrast, an obvious dissonance 
like the second is given by such a relatively complicated ratio as 8:9. Now the 
basic question is, and has always remained: Why is this so? Where does this 
apparent match between aesthetically pleasing sound and the ratios of the first 
few simple integers come from? 
This question has repeatedly been reformulated, both from the musical 
point of view, in that in the course of more than twenty-five centuries of 
harmonic development he range of the intervals accepted as consonant has 
been extended, and from the side of science, in that the type of answer that was 
supposed to provide the solution to the Pythagorean riddle of consonance has 
repeatedly been shifted, from the numerical and the mathematical, through 
the physical, to the physiological and the neurological. For present purposes it 
is sufficient to sketch the problem situation as it looked around the middle of 
the sixteenth century, just on the verge of the period of transformation that is 
to occupy us. 
At that time eight specific intervals were generally accepted as consonant, 
and functioned as such in virtually all musical composition (Table 1).5 The 
Pythagorean problem now presented itself in the following form: What do the 
integers that make up these few consonance-generating ratios have in 
common? What distinguishes them from all other numbers, which serve only 
to generate dissonances? What is it that enables those few simple integers to 
generate consonances? In other words, the problem was to find a numerical 
distinguishing criterion between consonance and dissonance and to explain 
how number could bring forth aesthetic pleasure. The authoritative answer 
was given by a learned Renaissance scholar and musician, Gioseffo Zarlino, 
who in 1558 expounded his theory of the senario. In his view, the senario, that 
is, the range of the first six positive integers, provided the clue to the riddle, as 
all integers that make up the consonance-generating ratios appear to be 
‘For simplicity’s sake I exclude throughout the ‘replicas’, that is, the consonances that exceed 
the range of one octave, such as the twelfth (1:3), which is the first replica of the fifth. 
Music as a Test-case 355 
confined within the senario. Nor is this due to chance, in view of the properties 
of the number six. Isn’t six the first perfect number (the first, that is, of those 
numbers that are themselves the sum of all factors into which they can be 
resolved, as 1 x 2 x 3 = 1 + 2 + 3)? Aren’t there six planets? Aren’t there six 
directions? Aren’t there twice six apostles? Didn’t God create the world in six 
days?, etc. And the senario not only thus distinguishes the consonant from the 
dissonant ratios, it also functions as the ‘sonorous number’, the ‘harmonic 
number’, that transforms outer numerical regularity into inner aesthetic 
pleasure through the correspondence between the harmony of this number and 
the harmony that governs the perceiving soul. Such is Zarlino’s solution to the 
problem of consonance.6 
Now before going further I wish to make it clear that this solution was not 
quite so ridiculous as it almost inevitably appears to us., It was entirely in 
keeping with the scientific climate of the time, exemplifying both Platonically 
inspired number mysticism and Aristotelian-type distinctions and unrefined 
empiricism. As such it provided a plausible explanation that covered the entire 
range of the problem to be solved. 
Yet there were a few drawbacks, too. One is particularly obvious: the ratio 
of the minor sixth is 5:8, hence it falls outside the senario. Zarlino managed to 
get out of this difficulty by applying a typically Aristotelian distinction: while 
the other consonances are actually contained in the senario, the minor sixth is 
so only potentially, which is really a rather pompous way of saying that in this 
special case eight should please be conceived of as twice four. But carrying out 
such a trick was forced on Zarlino because he could not possibly desert the 
senario and settle instead for the ottonario, the range of the first eight integers. 
For in that case the intervals whose ratios contain the number seven would 
have to be admitted as consonances as well. But these have no place in our 
musical scale at all, and the intervals nearest to them were traditionally 
regarded as very harsh dissonances. 
But a much more fundamental objection is of course the extreme 
arbitrariness with which Zarlino handled the wondrous properties of the 
number six. Evidently it would not at all be difficult to carry out a similar 
exercise with, for instance, the number seven: Didn’t God need seven days for 
the creation (for why not include His day of rest as well)? Aren’t there seven 
heavenly bodies in between the Earth and the fixed stars (also including the 
Sun)? Aren’t there seven wonders of the world? and so on. In short, it is 
precisely this sort of Renaissance number juggling that was to be altogether 
unpalatable to people with an altogether different conception of science, such 
6G. Zarlino, Isfitutioni harmoniche (Venezia, 1573). pp. 28 - 34; (facsimile edition, Ridgewood, 
1966; the first edition of the book is from 1558). 
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Fig. I. 
as were to appear only one generation after Zarlino and were to tackle afresh 
the old and venerable problem of consonance. One of these was Johannes 
Kepler. 
2.2. Kepler’s geometrical solution 
Music was an essential ingredient of Kepler’s scientific research program. 
The consonant intervals, and their derivation from one basic distinguishing 
criterion were to provide him with the knowledge of the mathematical 
proportions that had guided God in creating the universe and, hence, were to 
reveal the ultimate principles of the Harmony of the world. Kepler was 
convinced that the clue to the riddle of consonance could not be found in 
number, as Zarlino had taken for granted, but rather in geometrical figures: 
Geometry [. . .I, coeternal with God, and radiating in the divine Mind, supplied 
God with the models [. . .I for establishing the World so as to make it the Best and 
the Finest, in short, the most similar to its Creator.’ 
Kepler found his geometrical criterion distinguishing the consonances from the 
dissonances in the arcs that are cut off the circumference of a circumscribed 
circle by regular polygons. Take, for instance, the square and the pentagon. 
The inscribed square divides the circle into four equal parts, the pentagon into 
five, and so on (see Figure 1, taken from Harmonice kfundr]. 
These divisions generate proportions which result from a comparison of the 
various arcs thus cut off. In order to make such a comparison a distinction has 
to be made between part and residue. ‘Part’ here means either one or more 
arcs subtended by one or more sides of the polygon in question, such that the 
sum of the lengths of the arcs does not exceed one half of the circle. What 
remains of the circle is called the ‘residue’, which thus is either equal to or 
greater than the ‘part’. Now three kinds of comparisons can be made, namely: 
part to whole; residue to whole; part to residue. Thus the pentagon generates 
the following proportions: 
‘J. Kepler, Gesummelte Werke, M. Caspar et al. (eds), Vol. 6 (Miinchen. 1940), pp. 104- 105. 
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part to whole 
residue to whole 
part to residue 
1:5; 2:5 
3:5; 4:5 
1:4; 2:3. 
Evidently this procedure is much too broad to generate only the eight 
consonances, but by judiciously introducing three successive limiting 
conditions Kepler managed in the end to exclude all those regular polygons 
that would have left him with dissonance-generating proportions. (One of his 
rules is that only those polygons are admitted that are constructible by means 
of compass and ruler, and this is where his entire, unbelievably elaborate and 
ingenious edifice is now known to break down: for in Kepler’s system there is 
no use at all for the regular 17-gon that in 1796 was shown by Gauss to be 
constructible by compass and ruler after all). 
For Kepler, the entire construction served to solve only part of the problem 
of consonance, since it remained to be explained what property was capable of 
turning these proportions of the consonances into pleasing sounds. This 
process, Kepler explained, essentially takes place within the soul, and is 
performed by the soul. After certain musical sounds have reached the ear they 
are somehow taken inwards and are subjected to a more or less conscious 
comparison by the soul. In Kepler’s fine metaphor, they are ‘brought before 
the tribunal of the soul’. If the soul’s judgment is positive, they are turned into 
‘sensile harmonies’. This happens only to the consonances. All other musical 
intervals are rejected by the soul, and are thus experienced as disharmonious. 
In short: the consonances exist outside of the sense of hearing. Through it 
they reach the soul, which, in comparing the terms of the proportions of which 
they consist, turns them into harmony. Thus harmony is not something given 
from outside; rather harmony is an activity of the soul. 
Comparing something to something else is possible only if there is a 
common entity to which both terms of the comparison can be related. What 
entity enables the soul to compare the terms of the consonances, thus turning 
them into sensile harmonies? Kepler: 
To find a proper proportion in the sensile things is to discover and to recognize and 
to bring to light the similarity of this proportion in the sensile things with a certain 
Archetype of a most true Harmony, which is present in the Soul.’ 
This archetypical, or ‘intellectual’, harmony is the ultimate ground and 
explanation of the experience of musical beauty. Just like the sensile 
harmonies, the intellectual harmony needs reference points with regard to 
‘J. Kepler, op. cit. note 7, p. 215 
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which it can carry out its comparisons, and these reference points are by now 
familiar to us: they are the circle and the arcs cut off its circumference by the 
constructible regular polygons. 
Since the proportions of these arcs are independent of the size of the circle, 
size can be abstracted from the circle. The circle shrinks into a point; the soul 
becomes a ‘potential circle’, a ‘circle provided with directions’, a ‘qualitative 
point’. This archetypical circle is not an image of an archetype outside of the 
soul, but it is itself the archetype, that is to be conceived of as an abstract, 
geometrical idea. And Kepler also provides the final step: the soul is itself 
harmony; harmony is itself divine, and man takes part in it. 
Summing up, then, Kepler’s geometrical solution to the problem of 
consonance, we end up with the two following propositions: the arcs cut off a 
circle by certain well-defined inscribed regular polygons provide the criterion 
for distinguishing consonance from dissonance; these same geometrical 
figures, as archetypes present in the human soul, turn the consonant intervals 
into the experience of harmony. 
Thus the criterion found is indeed of a mathematical nature, in keeping with 
Kepler’s deepest convictions about the structure of the universe. Yet he was 
not totally blind to the possibility of physical considerations being also taken 
into account in dealing with matters pertaining to music. In fact from a brief 
discussion of the phenomenon of sympathetic resonance he derived a possible 
alternative explanation of consonance: 
If the velocity of one string has the ability to move another, proportionate string 
that to the eye appears not to be moved, then would not the equal velocities of two 
strings have the ability pleasantly to titillate the ear, since in a certain sense it is 
excited uniformly by both strings, and since the two strokes of both tones or 
vibrations coincide at every moment? 
But he at once rejected the idea: 
No, I say, this is too simple a way to settle the matter I. . .I For please, what 
relationship could there be between the titillation of the sense of hearing, which is a 
corporal thing, and the incredible delight that we perceive deep within our soul 
through the harmonic consonances? If the delight comes from the titillation, would 
not then the main part in this delight be played by the organ that sustains the 
titillation? [. . .I Add to this that the explanation taken from motion is applied in 
the first place to the unison; but sweetness lies not primarily in the unison, but in the 
other consonances and the combination thereof. Much [morel might be adduced in 
order to destroy this alleged explanation of the sweetness that comes from the 
consonances; but for the moment I prefer to desist from a more detailed 
disquisition.’ 
‘J. Kepler, op. cit. note 7, pp. 106 - 107. 
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In other words, Kepler’s arguments against an explanation of consonance by 
the coincidence of vibrations are the following: 
(1) The theory leaves unexplained what happens in between the pulses reaching 
the ear and the experience of beauty within us. 
(2) The theory, if valid, would only explain the consonance of the unison, not 
of the other consonant intervals and chords. 
It may at first sight seem conceivable that Kepler might have extended the 
theory so as to comprise the other consonances as well, thus invalidating his 
own second argument; and this is precisely what, as we shall see presently, 
Beeckman, Mersenne and Galileo were to do. But it is clear why Kepler did 
not: even apart from his primarily mathematically oriented interest discussed 
above, his first argument must have appeared to him to be an insuperable 
stumbling block. Most of his fellow musico-scientists were to accept this 
‘coincidence theory of consonance’ even in the absence of an explanation of 
how a physical property of nature, like coinciding pulses, can bring forth the 
human sensation of musical beauty. But Kepler already had such an 
explanation: he bridged the gap between the natural phenomenon and human 
sense experience by means of his theory of harmony. He rightly perceived that 
the coincidence theory could not close the gap; therefore, it had no attraction 
for Kepler, whose own theory could and did. 
2.3. The coincidence theory of consonance 
Thus we get acquainted with the coincidence theory of consonance through 
the man who anticipated it in rejecting it. Another, even earlier anticipation is 
to be found in the works of Giovanni Battista Benedetti (1585). But the 
coincidence theory was really established by Isaac Beeckman (in 1614- 1615). 
who communicated it to Rene Descartes (in 1618- 1619), and to Marin 
Mersenne (in 1629), whom he guided in elaborating the theory further, and 
also, independently of this cluster, by Galileo, who published a brief account 
in his 1638 Discorsi. 
In its simplest form, such as expounded by Galileo, the coincidence theory 
of consonance runs as follows. Sound is conceived of as a succession of 
‘strokes’, or ‘percussions’, which are supposed to be transmitted in a way quite 
similar to what happens in a quiet pond when a stone is thrown into it. The 
strokes are produced by the vibrating of a string or other musical instrument. 
Now every musical interval is characterized by a definitely patterned 
succession of such strokes. For instance, at the octave every single stroke of 
the lower string coincides with every second stroke of the upper string, owing 
to the fact that the upper one vibrates twice as rapidly as the lower one. (Both 
Beeckman and Galileo attempted to prove this new-found proportionality.) A 
similar argument can be set up for the fifth (3:2), the fourth (4:3), and so on. 
This regular coincidence, in being transmitted through the air to our sense of 
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hearing, is what explains the experience of consonance; if the strokes do not, 
or only very irregularly coincide, we perceive the intervals in question as 
dissonant. In Galileo’s own words: 
The Offence [the Dissonances] give, proceeds, I believe, from the discordant and 
jarring Pulsations of two different Tones, which, without any Proportion, strike the 
Drum of the Ear: And the Dissonances will be extreme harsh, in case the Times of 
the Vibrations are incommensurable.[. . .I Those Pairs of Sounds shall be 
Consonances, and will be heard with Pleasure, which strike the Timpanum in some 
Order; which order requires, in the first Place, that the Percussions made in the 
same Time be commensurable in Number, that the Cartilage of the Timpanum 01’ 
Drum may not be subject to a perpetual Torment of bending itself two different 
Ways, in submission to the ever disagreeing Percussion.” 
In the history of the problem of consonance the coincidence theory has been 
of the utmost importance. One reason is that, in providing a first precise, 
quantitative link between musical and acoustical phenomena, the coincidence 
theory gave much stimulus to drawing other phenomena of musical sound into 
the theory of consonance as well, such as beats and overtones (this was done in 
the main by Beeckman and Mersenne). Nor is this all, for the overall effect of 
the coincidence theory was a radical break of the problem of consonance with 
the entire past. Though superficially the theory looks like Zarlino’s senario in 
that exactly the same first few integers still appear to define the ratios of the 
consonances, in fact they do so in a decisively different way. The age-old 
problem could now be reformulated as follows: Why is it that the simple ratios 
of the vibrational frequencies of sounding bodies correspond to the human 
sensation of pleasure and beauty in hearing the consonant intervals? The 
original question had thus undergone a striking transformation in that now an 
empirical physical phenomenon rather than, as before, an abstract 
mathematical ratio appeared to be responsible for our sense experience. In the 
course of the centuries the problem was to be transformed again and again; 
but no transformation could be so radical as this one: having once entered the 
realm of the empirical, it was never to leave it again. 
Yet, when we take a somewhat closer look at the coincidence theory, and try 
to explore how far its explanatory power went, unexpected troubles appear to 
crop up. True, the theory had a certain inherent appeal, that was exploited to 
the full by Galileo. But when the theory was made a little bit more precise, was 
thoroughly quantified, and was made to generate predictions, its many 
“‘G. Galilei, Le Opere di Golilei, A. Favaro (ed.) (Firenze, 1890- 1909), Vol. 8, pp. 146- 147 
(The English is taken from Weston’s 1730 translation of the Discorsi, p. 151). 
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shortcomings oon became apparent, to the extent that the theory turned out 
not even to be able to solve the two problems for the solution of which it had 
been devised in the first place. 
The first of these two was the problem of how to find a clear-cut 
distinguishing criterion that matched the distinction between consonance and 
dissonance provided by our sense of hearing. The minor sixth (8:5) sounds 
evidently consonant, the second (9:8) equally evidently dissonant, but why in 
the world should the coincidence cf every eighth vibration of the upper string 
still be perceived as pleasant, but no longer every ninth vibration? Yet this is 
where, twenty centuries earlier, the entire problem of consonance had 
started;” apparently the fresh approach along physical lines could not yield 
the clear-cut criterion already searched for for so long. In fact it tended rather 
to blur the original distinction, as indeed was conceded rather reluctantly by 
Mersenne. 
The other fundamental problem had been to explain how a numerical 
regularity was capable of bringing forth the human experience of musical 
beauty. Just like the one above, this question had now been transformed from 
a question about numbers into one about vibrational frequencies. Galileo 
apparently felt satisfied by referring to the more or less harmonious way the 
eardrum was bent by the more or less coinciding strokes. Of all adherents to 
the coincidence theory only the two thorough-going mechanicists, Beeckman 
and Descartes, realized that in between the affected eardrum and the 
perceiving soul something remained to be explained (just as Kepler was doing 
at the time by means of his theory of Intellectual Harmony). Both attempted 
to show how the regularly coinciding vibrations were transmitted through 
material particles in the air, the eardrum, the middle ear, and the auditory 
nerve up to the seat of our perceptions, the brain. Both thought up intricate 
mechanisms of particulate ‘spirits’ running up and down the nerves, and, in so 
doing, opening or closing certain pores in the brain. To us it may be fairly 
evident that in this way the gap between the material mechanism and the 
perception itself cannot be closed, but can at best be shortened somewhat 
(which in itself is certainly no mean achievement). But the relevant point here 
is that even in Beeckman’s and Descartes’ own terms their effort at solving the 
auditory part of the body - mind problem failed, since there appeared to be no 
way to preserve the regularity of the original motion of the sounding body and 
of the air right to the end in the brain. In other words: Beeckman’s and 
Descartes’ corpuscular mechanisms made it intelligible (to their own 
satisfaction) how vibrations bring forth sound, but not how regularly coinciding 
“In fact, since the Greeks did not admit the thirds and sixths as consonances, to the 
Pythagoreans the problem appeared in a slightly different guise: they had to explain why 
consonance seems to stop after the number 4. 
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Octave 
Fifth 
Fourth 
Major sixth 
Major third 
Minor third 
Minor sixth 
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Table 2. 
Ratio (frequencies) Product 
1:l 1 
2:I 2 
3:2 6 
4:3 12 
j:3 15 
5:-I 20 
615 30 
8:s 40 
vibrations bring forth consonant sound. Beeckman was much more aware of 
this crucial gap in his theory than Descartes, yet both felt in the end compelled 
to appeal to certain aesthetic attributes of our sense perception, such as a 
preference for unity-in-variety, alternation-in-identity, and so forth. The 
invocation of these very principles makes it clear that no material principle had 
been found to connect outer regularity with inner pleasure. Thus the 
coincidence theory appeared not to be capable of solving the second 
fundamental problem of consonance either. 
Nor was it capable of solving a host of derived lesser problems. The entire 
list, as discussed in Quantifying Music, comprises eight such problems; here I 
shall restrict myself to a brief sketch of some of these. 
First of all, the coincidence theory implied, and at the same time seemed to 
solve, a problem that had never been stated before, namely that of providing a 
scale of degrees of consonance. Since an interval is the more consonant the 
more often the ‘strokes’ coincide, such a table is given simply by multiplying 
the terms of the frequency ratios of the consonant intervals. 
Unfortunately this neat table (Table 2), that follows so inexorably from the 
coincidence theory, in its turn creates a great many new problems, all blissfully 
ignored by Galileo, but tackled head-on by Beeckman and Mersenne. For 
instance, in musical practice the status of the fourth as a consonance had 
become rather questionable, and certainly it was considered by most musicians 
to be less consonant than the major third. But Table 2 places the fourth higher 
in the hierarchy of the consonances than its rival, so how to account for that? 
Both Beeckman and Mersenne had to set up very involved arguments in order 
to get out of this difficulty. Also, the order given by Table 2 for the thirds and 
sixths is much more explicit than musical practice warranted. In particular, 
musical experience provided no reason for giving the major sixth a higher 
status than the major third. An even more compelling objection to be made 
against the above table is the following. If the table is valid, the intervals 
represented by the frequency ratios 7:4 and 7:5 should be considered 
consonances as well, the former in preference even to the minor third (as 
28<30), the latter preceding the minor sixth (as 3X40). But these intervals had 
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always been considered as very harsh dissonances (Kepler, in his geometrical 
approach to the problem of consonance, succeeded in getting rid of them 
through the inconstructibility of the heptagon). For adherents to the 
coincidence theory there were only three ways out of the dilemma: to declare it 
insoluble, to manipulate the table, or to pronounce the intervals with seven to 
be consonances after all. Again: each of these solutions found its defenders; 
virtually none tended to make things in the end less rather than more 
complicated. 
Not only the scale of degrees of consonance, but the coincidence theory 
itself also ran into serious difficulties. One is the problem of tempering. No 
one who has ever attempted to tune a musical instrument can have failed to 
notice that in musical practice hardly any consonance sounds really pure; for 
instance, the major third, when struck on an equally-tempered piano, sounds 
quite perceptibly impure, though still consonant. Now ‘tempering’ means 
slightly altering the frequency ratio of the interval in question, e.g. from 5 to 4 
for the pure major third to 5.04 . . . to 4 for the equally-tempered major third. 
But if consonance is supposed to result from frequently coinciding strokes, 
how, then, can tempered consonances be perceived as consonant, rather than 
as thoroughly dissonant? 
The theory predicts that the incommensurable ratios of precisely the least- 
tempered intervals would entirely destroy the consonant effect: the smaller the 
deviation, the worse the effect. But in fact the ear appears to put up with small 
deviations very well, and the smaller the better. It notices only some beating, 
that increases with the rate of deviation from the true ratio. All this was noted 
only by the one man whose version of the coincidence theory was least affected 
by it, namely, Beeckman. All other adherents to the theory would have had to 
acknowledge that this was an insuperable objection, if only they had become 
aware of it. 
Finally, the coincidence theory presupposes that the strokes of the two notes 
that make up the consonant interval start at exactly the same moment. But 
why should the strokes of, for example, the octave, proceed as shown in Fig. 2, 
t 
FIG. 2. 
Upper note 
1 
Bottom note 
I 
FIG. 3 
Upper note 
4 
Bottom note 
rather than as shown in Fig. 3, and thus never coincide? No one, at the time, 
appears to have noticed this fatal objection to the coincidence theory. The first 
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to make this point seems to have been Newton, who considered it sufficient 
reason for rejecting the coincidence theory.” 
And so we might go on. Altogether a list can be drawn up of no less than 
eight new issues the coincidence theory was virtually powerless to solve. Add 
to this that it failed equally to provide satisfactory answers to the two original 
problems of consonance, and it becomes rather urgent to ask why in the world 
this theory was ever adopted by any scientist in his right senses. Yet in fact, 
within 20-30 years after it had been conceived of by Beeckman, the 
coincidence theory was to become the dominant explanation of consonance, 
entirely replacing the senario that had reigned supreme for half a century, and 
also defeating Kepler’s geometrical explanation in the process. After the 
coincidence theory had been elaborated in the twenties and thirties by 
Beeckman himself, by Mersenne, and by Descartes, and had been proclaimed 
to the world by Mersenne (in 1636- 1637) and by Galileo (in 1638), the theory 
was adopted by Gassendi, by Hooke, by Huygens, by Leibniz, and a host of 
others, while the only one to reject it, Newton, never even attempted to frame 
a better hypothesis. Not until the middle of the 18th century was the 
coincidence theory to be replaced by the overtone theory of Rameau and 
D’Alembert, which in its turn would be overthrown in 1863 by Helmholtz, 
whose explanation is basically still considered the best available. It is based on 
beating phenomena, and also preserves some defining features of the 
seventeenth century coincidence theory of consonance. 
2.4. Why did the coincidence theory beat its rivals? 
Let us now try to formulate as drastically as possible the paradoxical 
situation our historical survey has led us into. 
Around 1640 three rival theories of consonance were available. One was the 
senario. For those who were willing to accept the explanatory principles on 
which it was based, it explained everything there was to explain. One detail 
(the minor sixth) had to be dealt with in an ad hoc manner; for the rest no 
problems remained. The second available theory of consonance was Kepler’s. 
Despite all the many and important conceptual differences between Zarlino’s 
and Kepler’s theories, in a structural sense the two had much in common. 
Kepler’s theory, too, took into account all available data. It, too, covered the 
entire problem, from the production of musical sound through various 
transmitting agencies up to and including the perceiving soul. It, too, left no 
“H. W. Turnbull (ed.), The Correspondence of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1960). Vol. 2, pp. 
206 - 207 (I owe this reference to Penelope Gouk). 
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questions open. In short, both the senario and Kepler’s theory at least 
succeeded in explaining the problem of consonance in accordance with their 
own standards. 
Now compare these two with the coincidence theory, which, according to its 
own standards, clearly failed to do so. Not only did the coincidence theory fail 
to solve the two original problems of consonance it had set out to solve; it also 
entailed no less than eight predictions that were all incompatible with the 
available data. What, then, made this seemingly hopeless failure carry the day 
for more than a century, in the presence of two rival theories which displayed 
none of its glaring deficiencies? 
Admittedly this way of presenting the issue forces the historical picture 
somewhat. Some of the weaknesses of the coincidence theory were not 
perceived by anyone at the time, and others were solved in ways which may 
seem to us clearly ad hoc, but which were apparently capable of satisfying 
contemporary scientists. Yet such amendments do not really change the 
picture: the coincidence theory did leave open obvious gaps precisely on the 
most basic issues. Kepler had anticipated so much, and had warned against 
adopting the coincidence theory for this very reason. Why did no one else 
care? 
Let us cautiously adduce some considerations that may serve to disentangle 
the apparent paradox. One important clue is provided by an inquiry into what 
our main personages themselves had to say on the issue. What objections were 
advanced by the adherents to the coincidence theory against their competitors? 
It is abundantly clear from their works that Zarlino-type number juggling no 
longer had much attraction for them. But, unfortunately, none of them ever 
took the trouble of pointing out explicitly what, in his view, was wrong with 
the senario. I3 Therefore we have to restrict ourselves to objections made 
against Kepler’s explanation of consonance. Let us take a close look at two 
statements that seem to me particularly revealing: 
There is no number of motions or percussions of the air that is not commensurable 
to all other numbers of motions. Which is why I am surprised that Kepler has dared 
to introduce the comparison of [geometrical] figures with the Consonances, with the 
aim of deriving from them their number and their quality; which could have been 
tolerated if he had been content with comparing the said figures with the 
Consonances and the Dissonances by way of analogy and for entertainment.” 
“Yet slightly more implicit criticisms abound; for some examples see Quantifying Music 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), p. 107 and note 8 to II. 
I’M. Mersenne, Harmonie Universefle (Paris, 1636- 1637), ‘Livre premier des consonances’, 
prop. 33; p. 86. 
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[I posit1 this foundation, that [. . .I the sounds of [. . .I consonances actually cause, 
through motion, something inside us to change place, which is not done by Kepler.” 
The first criticism is from Mersenne, the second from Beeckman. The point 
they are both making here is that Kepler’s explanation of consonance was 
insufficient, not for inherent reasons, but because it relied on explanatory 
principles that were scientifically inadmissible. IMersenne is saying here that 
Kepler had explained consonance by appealing to geometric figures, rather 
than starting from the predominant feature of musical sound, which is 
motion. 
This is a very relevant point for two distinct reasons. In the first place it calls 
attention to the fact that the coincidence theory was directly based on an 
elementary property of musical sound, namely the exact quantitative 
relationship between vibrational frequency and pitch that had just been 
discovered. A theory such as Kepler’s, that simply passed by the most basic 
property of the phenomenon to be explained, could not be accepted, however 
ingenious it might otherwise be. Nor is this all. Motion, to Mersenne, meant 
much more than vibrational frequency. For the new scientific approach 
Mersenne was endorsing so enthusiastically, motion was the key to the analysis 
of many more phenomena of nature. Hence Kepler’s, or, for that matter, 
Zarlino’s explanations of consonance were already a priori untenable in that 
they had employed purely mathematical concepts that could not be used 
outside of the domain for which they had been designed in the first place. 
A closely related point seems to be expressed by Beeckman’s criticism. In 
explaining body-mind interaction, Beeckman is saying here, Kepler appealed 
to immaterial agencies such as ‘Intellectual Harmony’, rather than invoking 
the true scientific principle of the motion of particles of matter. Kepler’s 
theory of consonance is unacceptable, not because it does not explain 
consonance, but because it does not explain consonance. Kepler’s explanatory 
principles had been designed specifically for dealing with this one problem. 
The principles proposed by Mersenne and Beeckman, on the contrary, were 
being applied to various and sundry other phenomena of nature: to free fall, to 
the nature of light, to air pressure, and so on. Compared to the overall fertility 
of these new scientific principles it did not matter so much to what precise 
extent the coincidence theory of consonance could accomplish what it might 
ideally be hoped to accomplish. Whether or not it ran perfectly in all respects, 
its adherents felt themselves to be on the right track. The possibility of 
“I. Beeckman, Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 ri 1634, C. de Waard (ed.), (Den 
Haag, 1939- 1953), Vol. 3, p. 69. 
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applying the same brand-new explanatory principles to other domains of 
science with at least some measure of success was there to prove it. 
This, I think, goes a long way towards explaining the odd fact that so many 
seemingly obvious clashes of the theory with experience were simply not 
noticed at all, or at least not felt to be really consequential. Had the attention 
of our musico-scientists been directed towards an active search for 
countervailing evidence, they would not have failed to notice, for instance, 
that the coincidence theory presupposes a synchronicity of strokes that is, in 
fact, highly unlikely to occur. But they had no real motive to set out on such a 
search, precisely because they were confident that the coincidence theory 
rested on secure foundations that were proving their mettle in other domains 
of science. 
And this was still not all. Precisely by answering all relevant questions and 
by accounting for all known relevant data both Zarlino and Kepler had failed 
to generate new questions which migh have led to the finding of new data, or 
to discovering that certain phenomena known of old were indeed relevant to 
the problem. But such service was abundantly performed by the coincidence 
theory. Precisely by leaving open so much it inspired the search for more. The 
senario and the theory of the regular polygons had not led to the discovery of 
the overtones, or to the realization of the importance of beats; the coincidence 
theory did. The senario and Kepler’s theory had to be treated on a ‘take it or 
leave it’ basis; each had to be accepted wholly, or to be rejected wholly. One 
might or might not believe in the ontological significance of number; if one did 
not, there was no more room left for anything like the senario. One might or 
might not accept Kepler’s view of the Creation; if one did not, such concepts 
as ‘Intellectual Harmony’ lost their entire raison d’.@fre. In other words, for 
these theories, the basis of rejection was not really the one that has since 
become proper to the criticism of scientific theories. In modern science, 
criticism usually takes the form of pointing out that a theory (provided it is 
internally consistent) leaves certain relevant data unexplained, or that it 
clashes with relevant facts, or that it entails consequences that clash with other 
phenomena. Kepler’s criticism of the coincidence theory had been of such a 
nature. But Kepler’s own theory could not be criticized in a similar way. Much 
later it was discovered to be faulty in that there are more constructible regular 
polygons than Kepler had imagined. Yet it is clear that Gauss’ discovery of the 
constructibility of the 17-gon was not destructive of Kepler’s theories of 
harmony in the normal way. Much more, in judging Kepler’s theory, depends 
on whether or not one shares Kepler’s highly personal, partly Platonic, partly 
Christian view of the Creation, which we have seen to underlie his entire 
theory of harmony. Therefore, the basic distinction to be made is that, while 
conforming to the scientific standards of their own time, these very standards 
368 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
permitted both Zarlino’s and Kepler’s theories of consonance to be essentially 
metaphysical rather than scientific in the modern, post-Galilean sense. 
This is true of Zarlino’s theory in a very obvious way: the way he operated 
with numbers had rapidly become incompatible with the scientific methods 
and approaches that came to the fore at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. But it was also true, in a much more subtle way, of Kepler’s geometric 
concepts. Kepler’s explanation of consonance was unlike more common 
metaphysical constructions in that it made much use of refined scientific 
concepts. Precisely in this wonderful mixture lies the enduring fascination 
exerted by his work. Yet it was not really scientific in the sense this word was 
acquiring in the course of precisely the period we are dealing with. 
As against all this, the coincidence theory could be accepted on a tentative 
basis. Its adherents committed themselves, not to a fixed theoretical structure, 
but rather to a research program. To either Zarlino’s or Kepler’s theories one 
could respond only with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’; neither provided a motive for 
subsequent inquiry. But the coincidence theory did, precisely because it was 
such an inspiring mixture of right and wrong. There was no decisive reason for 
considering its numerous deficiencies as so many falsifying instances. Rather 
the theory held out the prospect of turning its numerous shortcomings into so 
many confirmations. And this is precisely what, in the course of the 
seventeenth century, its adherents set out to do. 
III. Four metatheories of science historically tested 
Let the above interpretation of one particular historical case of theory 
replacement be granted some measure of plausibility. Then our next business is 
to assume successively four different, theoretically given patterns of theory 
replacement; to investigate what our actual historical event would have looked 
like in each of these four cases; and to weigh the resulting differences and 
correspondences. As announced in the Introduction, I choose the following 
metatheories: the inductivist view, Popper’s ‘falsifiability’ account, Kuhn’s 
schema of paradigms and revolutions, and Feyerabend’s ‘theoretical 
pluralism’. Two of these, I think, are fairly obviously at variance with the 
historical facts of our case. 
To begin with, the inductivist view that science grows through the 
accumulation of ever more facts generalized into ever more-embracing 
theories is clearly incompatible with our findings. The coincidence theory was 
certainly not occasioned by new facts having been found in the first place 
(although, indeed, it served to generate new facts; but that is a different issue). 
If the number of facts explained were a valid criterion for choosing between 
theories, the coincidence theory, which failed even to solve the core problems 
of consonance, would have lost the battle right from the start. 
Music as a Test-case 369 
True, the inductivist could reply that I have said myself that the senario and 
Kepler’s theory did not properly belong to science. Therefore, only one 
scientific theory of consonance was available, and the question of why it 
became the reigning theory appears to be spurious by definition. But this goes 
a little too far. When discussing the ‘unscientific’ elements in Zarlino’s and 
Kepler’s theories of consonance I took care to qualify: they only fall short 
according to the new standards that came to the fore in the course of the 
Scientific Revolution; according to Renaissance standards both make fine, 
scientific theories. For the inductivist the only way out is to let the ‘history of 
the inductive sciences’ start with the Scientific Revolution, which seems to me 
a very unhistorical thing to do. Of course, the distinction between modern and 
pre-modern science plays an important part in the discussion of our historical 
case, and will continue to do so in the theoretical analysis. But the point is that 
one needs criteria for making the distinction, rather than achieving it by 
definition. The inductivist account, however, fails to provide these. Even if we 
were to take the exclusion of the senario for granted, the coincidence theory 
would seem a very unlikely candidate to start the inductive science of music 
with: as we have seen, there was scarcely any musical fact that it really 
managed to account for (as, again, Kepler was urgently aware). But is not 
covering the known facts the first and foremost requirement for an inductive 
theory? So the inductivist would wind up stating that the two theories that did 
cover the known facts were unscientific, whereas the one that did not was the 
only scientific one. But this is incompatible with the inductivist criterion 
itself. 
The other metatheory that is far from easily reconciled with our historical 
case is Feyerabend’s. In his view each theory sets its own standards, and it 
would be useless to look for external criteria to choose between one theory and 
another. The business of choosing between theories is irrational, and subject 
ultimately to matters of taste and fashion. Now if it were indeed true that no 
objective, rational criteria are applied by scientists in opting for one theory 
rather than for another, then it is not clear how such a clear-cut pattern of 
theory choice as we have observed in our historical case could possibly have 
come about. To begin with, the rejection of the senario and of Kepler’s theory 
was universal. No scientist who took part in the Scientific Revolution ever 
adopted Zarlino’s theory of consonance; even Gassendi, who followed Zarlino 
closely in every other aspect of musical theory, replaced the senario by the 
coincidence theory.16 And no student of the science of music has ever adopted 
Kepler’s explanation of consonance. Obviously the scientists involved did so 
because they applied certain external criteria, and it is our business to identify 
16P. Gassendi, Opera Omniu (Lyon, 1658). vol. 5, PP. 643-645. 
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these, rather than to evade the issue by denying their existence. Yet that is what 
would be done by ascribing this universal preference to strangely 
corresponding ‘tastes’ or to a common urge to run after the fashionable. The 
rejection of the senario and of Kepler’s theory was achieved before the 
coincidence theory even had had a chance to become the latest fashion. And as 
for ‘tastes’, these differed widely, from Galileo’s mathematical and 
experimental approach, through Mersenne’s sceptical experimentalism, to 
Beeckman’s and Descartes’ adherence to the mechanical philosophy. 
Nevertheless, they all concurred in opting for one and the same theory of 
consonance. Nor were they lacking in criteria for doing so: our quotations 
from Mersenne and Beeckman, in particular, have made it quite clear what 
external criteria they applied in rejecting the approach of their predecessors. 
These criteria derived from the place the category of motion and the 
corpuscular hypothesis had acquired in the explanation of the phenomena of 
nature. As such these were at the heart of what the Scientific Revolution was 
about, and whether or not they are capable of convincing us, they are certainly 
based on considerations that go far beyond what at the time could qualify as 
‘taste’ or ‘fashion’. 
The two remaining metatheories under discussion here appear to make more 
sense in view of our problem, Popper’s even more so than Kuhn’s. Popper’s 
metatheory has its origin in his interest in two basic, and related problems: to 
find out what makes science grow and what distinguishes scientific from non- 
scientific (in his parlance: ‘metaphysical’) statements. His answers have 
centered on the notion of falsifiability. That is, what distinguishes scientific 
from non-scientific theories is their being amenable, in principle, to 
falsification. For a theory to be accepted as scientific it must be possible to 
spell out under what specific conditions it will be given up. As it is always 
possible to evade threatening falsification by adopting some ad hoc hypothesis 
in order to save the theory, a conscious methodological decision on the part of 
the scientist is required to ensure that science will continue to grow. In 
Popper’s view, the progress of science lies in the continuous process of 
advancing ever bolder theories that survive ever harsher empirical tests, until 
they are refuted as a result of an even harsher test and replaced by an even 
bolder theory. ‘Bold’ in this connection means ‘forbidding many possible 
states of affairs’. ‘Metaphysical’ theories, in Popper’s view, are compatible 
with any conceivable state of affairs; there is no fact in the world that might be 
used to refute them. But in science, the bolder a theory is, the more possible 
states of affairs are ruled out by it, and thus the more it says about our world. 
Let us suppose for the moment that this metatheory of science is correct. 
What, then, would have been the truly scientific decision to make for a 
musico-scientist, confronted around 1640 with our three different theories of 
consonance? First of all he would have been perfectly justified in dismissing 
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Zarlino’s senario as unscientific, since it cannot be refuted. Second, he would 
have perceived the essentially metaphysical nature of Kepler’s theory behind 
its numerous truly scientific analyses, and therefore he would have discarded it 
as well. Third, he would have adopted the coincidence theory on a tentative 
basis, and have tried to derive testable consequences from it. 
So far Popper’s metatheory fits the historical facts admirably, for this is 
precisely what we discovered indeed to have happened. Also let me emphasize, 
before proceeding to the more questionable part of our metatheoretical testing 
procedure, that this in itself is no mean achievement, since none of the 
competing metatheories has even come close to offering an explanation, on a 
logical basis, of what enabled the coincidence theory to beat its rivals. Nor, to 
be sure, does Kuhn’s metatheory, for the crisis in puzzle-solving that, in his 
view, precedes any revolutionary change of paradigms is conspicuously absent 
from the events that led to the adoption of the coincidence theory. Its 
originators surely never struggled with puzzles that could not be solved within 
the framework of the senario; rather they tacitly dismissed it. The senario was 
overthrown as a result of a shift in explanatory principles; it was rejected 
because it was iricompatible with the new principles. The trouble with the 
senario was precisely that it did not give rise to ‘puzzles’; only its being 
dismissed paved the way for posing new and fruitful scientific problems. 
Nevertheless, Kuhn’s metatheory will appear to contain some quite helpful 
elements when we proceed now to the second stage, and inquire what, 
according to Popper’s logic of scientific discovery, our scientist was to do once 
he had adopted the coincidence theory, and, hence, was to confront its 
implications with musical reality. 
Here we tread disputed epistemological ground. It has often been held 
against Popper that scientists do not really submit to falsifying evidence, let 
alone actively seek it. If it were indeed Popper’s view that any apparent clash 
of the empirical consequences of a theory with some observation statement 
would constitute an actual falsification of the theory, then his metatheory 
would clearly be at odds with what happened in the case of the coincidence 
theory. As we have seen, this theory clashes with no less than eight of such 
contrary facts, and even if allowance is made for the ones that were not 
noticed at the time, enough of them remain to call into question Popper’s 
alleged account. 
But this is demonstrably not Popper’s view on the actual process of 
falsification. Take, for instance, what he wrote in 1974, in an attempt to 
combat this particular Popper legend: 
. . . no test of any theoretical statement is final or conclusive, and [. . .I the 
empirical, or the critical, attitude involves the adherence to some ‘methodological 
rules’ which tell us not to evade criticism but to accept refutations (though not too 
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easily). These rules are essentially somewhat flexible. As a consequence the 
acceptance of a refutation is nearly as risky as the tentative adoption of a 
hypothesis.” 
In fact, from 1934 on Popper has devoted much effort to pointing out under 
what conditions a theory should be considered definitely falsified. Broadly 
speaking, this is the case when hypotheses introduced in order to save the 
theory tend to reduce the empirical content of the theory, that is, tend to 
reduce the range of possible facts forbidden by the theory, An example is 
provided by the celebrated occasion when Newton’s theory of gravitational 
attraction was threatened with falsification because of certain incompatible 
phenomena observed in the orbit of Uranus. In Popper’s view the hypothesis 
that this was due to the calculable presence of another, unknown planet nearby 
(later identified as Neptune) was a quite admissible one, because it increased 
the testability of the original theory. Therefore, theories should not be 
considered falsified until it appears that they can only be saved by introducing 
ad hoc hypotheses that tend to make them irrefutable. 
Now the point I want to make here is that even such a much more 
sophisticated metatheory of the falsification of theories fails to account for 
what happened with the coincidence theory. The hypotheses introduced in 
order to save the coincidence theory from refutation on the basis of, for 
instance, the anomaly of the fourth (the fact, that is, that in musical practice 
the major third is treated as more consonant than the fourth, whereas the 
theory would have it the other way round) were clearly of such an ad hoc 
nature. If Popper were entirely right here, the musico-scientists who originated 
or adopted the coincidence theory - and they were among the very best 
scientists of their time! - would have had to give it up in face of the fact that it 
could only be saved on an ad hoc basis. Since no scientific rival theory was 
available the truly scientific thing for them to do would have been to declare 
the coincidence theory wrong, and to use it only as a kind of working 
hypothesis in the search for a better theory. Yet this they did not do. Why not? 
To the Kuhnian reader the answer to this question will be obvious. For we 
seem now to be dealing with precisely the situation that is typical for ‘normal 
science’ once it has started afresh after a new paradigm has been adopted. 
According to Kuhn a new paradigm never promises to provide beforehand the 
solution to all conceivable problems in the field in question. Rather it 
functions as the framework within which these problems, anomalies, etc. may 
be tackled as ‘puzzles’, i.e. as the routine business of the scientific community 
“K. R. Popper, ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, P. A. Schilpp 
(ed.) (La Salle, Illinois, 1974). p. 79 (cp. K. R. Popper, op cit. note 3, pp. 986-987). 
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that has adopted the paradigm. And thus the Kuhnian will have read with 
great satisfaction my account of how Beeckman, Mersenne, Descartes, 
Huygens e tufti quanti, immediately after adopting the coincidence theory set 
themselves tasks of solving the anomaly of the fourth, the problem of 
tempering, the objection arising from the absent synchronicity of the strokes 
that according to the theory make up the consonant intervals, and so on. 
And yet this orthodox Kuhnian ‘rational reconstruction’ will not quite do, 
for two distinct reasons. The first is that, in historical fact, so many of these 
‘puzzles’ were not treated as puzzles: only the anomaly of the fourth was 
tackled by a great many adherents to the coincidence theory, whereas most 
other ‘puzzles’ were either totally ignored or just noticed by one or two, at 
best, of all those quite numerous adherents to the theory. And second, even 
more importantly, there were not only these eight derived problems, or 
‘puzzles’; the situation was much more serious in that, as we have seen, the 
coincidence theory failed even to provide a solution to the two classical core 
problems of consonance. Not even the Kuhnian concept of paradigm can be 
stretched so far as to provide an explanation of why a ‘paradigm’ that, like the 
senario, was able to solve the fundamental problem at hand, was replaced by a 
new ‘paradigm’ that was not. Against this the Kuhnian might argue that the 
entire point is irrelevant because the senario never belonged to science, and, 
hence, what happened to it is unrelated to the problem of how scientific 
progress comes about. But Kuhn is far too much of a historian thus to exclude 
pre-modern science from science altogether;” and in fact his overall schema 
would not yield any applicable criterion for doing so. 
We conclude that neither Popper’s nor Kuhn’s metatheories of science 
appear to be capable of explaining wholly the behavior of our musico- 
scientists in rejecting both the senario and Kepler’s theory and adopting, 
instead, the coincidence theory. The historical explanation of this apparent 
paradox has already been given in the above, and it reads: our musico- 
scientists acted as they did, because the coincidence theory was based on 
explanatory principles that operated successfully in many other branches of 
science. A new comprehensive research program had become available, 
according to which the phenomena of nature had to be analyzed in terms of 
matter and motion. This broad research program met with so much initial 
success throughout the various domains of science that it prevented the 
rejection of a particular theory in one particular field that probably would 
have been considered hopeless had it stood on its own. 
It must be acknowledged at once that this answer is not entirely foreign to 
Kuhn’s metatheory. On the one hand, we have now seen that Kuhn’s claim 
“Th. S. Kuhn, The Strucrure of Scientific Revolufions (Chicago, 1970) (in particular Ch I-II). 
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that ‘probably the single most prevalent claim advanced by the proponents of 
a new paradigm is that they can solve the problems that have led the old one to 
a crisis”’ is wide of the mark in our case (there having been neither a crisis of 
the older paradigm, nor this ability of the new one to solve the problems left 
open by its predecessor). A conceivable way out of the difficulty would be for 
the orthodox Kuhnian to say that the concept of paradigm should be given 
much wider scope in that not the senario as such, but rather the entire set of 
Renaissance explanatory principles served as a paradigm to the scientific 
community at the time. According to such an hypothetical view not the victory 
of the coincidence theory, but the entire Scientific Revolution (or at least its 
first stage) would yield the proper framework to account for what happened in 
our case of theory replacement. Now this view indeed makes eminent sense; 
but one should be aware that it is incompatible with the mainstream of Kuhn’s 
argument, since Kuhn unambiguously describes quite a few cases of theory 
replacement in the course of the Scientific Revolution as separate, individual 
examples of paradigm shift (for instance, Kepler’s work on planetary orbits, 
or Galileo’s new view of pendular motion, or the mechanical philosophy, or 
seventeenth century optics). And in fact he is forced by his own position to do 
so, because he aims at establishing an unchanging pattern of scientific 
progress, whereas appealing to the Scientific Revolution, which was the one 
unique historical event that divides much of traditional science from much of 
science in the modern sense, would not yield the kind of generalizable structure 
he is looking for. 
Despite all this, there are indeed some fleeting passages in Kuhn’s 
enumeration of reasons for the replacement of one paradigm by another that 
border on the historical account given in the above: 
Sometimes the looser practice that characterizes extraordinary research [i.e. research 
in a time of paradigm shift] will produce a candidate for paradigm that initially 
helps not at all with the problems that have evoked crisis. When that occurs, 
evidence must be drawn from other parts of the field as it often is anyway.“’ 
Again, this one remark is scarcely allowed by its author to influence his overall 
schema of how progress in science comes about. Yet it does remind us of one 
important, though under-exploited, advantage of Kuhn’s concept of 
paradigm, which is that it need not be restricted to theories, or to coherent sets 
of theories, but may also cover those fundamental assumptions regarding what 
‘Vh. S. Kuhn, op. cit. note 18, p. 153. 
“Th. S. Kuhn, op. cif. note 18, p. 154. 
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science is and how it should be done that, whether scientists are aware of it or 
not, underlie their theories. 
I do not think that a notion comparable to this is to be found in the 
numerous discussions Popper devoted to the problem of why scientists prefer 
one theory over another? but one of my aims in the next and final section of 
this paper will be to argue that such an idea can easily by incorporated into his 
overall account of scientific progress without destroying any of its main 
points. 
IV. Summary and conclusions 
Let me first sum up how far the argument by now has got us. I have argued 
four successive points. I have demonstrated how strange it is, at first sight, 
that the coincidence theory was generally favored at the expense of its two 
rivals. I have tried to explain the apparent paradox by showing that the two 
rivals were metaphysical rather than scientific theories in the modern sense, 
and that the coincidence theory was based on explanatory principles that were 
proving their mettle in many domains other than the science of music. I have 
pointed out that all this is incompatible with either an inductivist or a 
‘pluralist’ metatheory of science. Finally I have shown that the first part of my 
historical explanation fits in exactly with Popper’s metatheory, while the 
second part has more in common with elements derived from Kuhn’s. Even 
though Kuhn’s metatheory has appeared to be incompatible with the results of 
my research insofar as the replacement of theories is concerned, I do believe 
that it fills an important gap left open by Popper’s logic of falsification 
procedures. 
On the basis of this result we may perhaps formulate a tentative hypothesis 
which states that in the process of deciding whether or not a given theory 
should be considered falsified an important element is the extent to which the 
explanatory principles that underlie the theory in question are themselves part 
of a larger, successfully operating research program. 
At this point we might well stop, leaving both the Kuhnian and the 
Popperian reader somewhat dissatisfied with the mixed result thus reached. 
Yet in the following I wish to enhance their dissatisfaction even more by asking 
now what reasons there could be for either to care at all about this result of our 
metatheoretical testing procedure. Why, the Kuhnian may well ask, why 
“See in particular K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959), 
pp. 108 - 111 (Section 30), and K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach 
(Oxford, 1972). I, sections 7 - 9. 
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should I give up Kuhn’s brilliant, convincin g, and historically reliable schema 
of how science progresses just because one crazy little Renaissance theory, the 
senario, was not quite capable of giving rise to crisis before being discarded for 
good by men of the stature of Kepler and Galileo? And why, I hear the 
Popperian within myself asking, why should I be prepared to give up a 
philosophy that has led to so many brilliant and important insights into such 
various subjects as, for example, democracy and totalitarianism, the nature of 
rationality, the writing of history, Plato, Marx and Freudianism, just because 
three centuries ago a few scientists failed, in their behavior towards one 
particular theory, to comply down to the last detail with the fine structure of 
Popper’s ideas on falsification procedures ?” Or, formulated more broadly, is 
it reasonable to expect a metatheory of science to be in exact conformity with 
every single case of scientific progress in the entire history of science? Does this 
not make all these metatheories much too easy prey for counterinstances to be 
dug up by the diligent historian? Aren’t we asking a bit too much from the 
philosophy of science if we require it to provide us with explanations that aim 
to cover the performance of, say, a few isolated Greek philosophers of nature 
just as well as the interactions of twentieth century scientists who operate in 
such a different scientific climate; socially, culturally, financially, 
institutionally, so entirely different surroundings? Is it a priori reasonable to 
expect that, whereas over the past twenty-five centuries so many things have 
changed so fundamentally in science, yet the overall structure of the way it 
progresses should have remained the same? 
I do not feel capable of giving a definite, let alone definitive, response to 
these questions; yet the way I just phrased them may make it clear that I tend 
to answer them in the negative. To my historian’s mind it seems really too rash 
to suppose that one and the same model could possibly account for all 
scientific progress, irrespective of time, place, and circumstances. In recent 
years such models have been cropping up at an alarming rate, each providing a 
hasty generalization supported by a few historical pet examples.23 It seems to 
me that these attempts at improving on existing models like Popper’s and 
Kuhn’s really tackle the problem from the wrong end, and that it would be 
much better for philosophers of science to work along slightly more inductive 
lines, by investigating in depth a few historical cases from one and the same 
period, cautiously looking for tenable generalizations, and carefully 
attempting to apply these to cases from adjacent periods, using changes over 
time in the overall scientific and social setting as variables that might help to 
L? Popper has briefly discussed the testability of his own metatheory in his ‘Replies to my Critics’ 
(op. cit. note 3). p. 1010; see also his Conjeclures and Refutations. The Growfh of Scientific 
Knowledge (London, 1965), pp. 197 - 200. 
“To mention just one example: C. Dilworth, Scientific Progress. A Sfudy concerning the 
Nature of the Relation between Successive Scientific Theories (Dordrecht, 1981). 
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explain the no doubt limited applicability of the original model.” I now intend 
to do something like this at the end of the present paper by asking why it is that 
both Popper’s and Kuhn’s models turned out to fit our historical case to some 
extent, but neither of them entirely so? We have seen that, partly, Popper 
succeeded where Kuhn failed: the senario was not overthrown as a result of a 
crisis in puzzle-solving, but rather because it was felt (together with Kepler’s 
theory of consonance) to be metaphysical instead of being open to really 
scientific discussion. It seems to me that this result need not at all be 
universally valid, since in fact it is closely linked up with the period in 
question, that of the first stage of the Scientific Revolution. This was precisely 
the unique turning point in history when in a number of key sciences such 
ultimately metaphysical explanatory models as Aristotelian qualities, 
Renaissance sympathies and antipathies, number mysticism and the like, were 
replaced by modes of explanation that have ever since been regarded as really 
scientific. Thus the period chosen for our historical case is precisely the one to 
which Popper’s demarcation criterion between science and non-science might 
a priori have been expected to be particularly applicable. To be sure, the fact 
that it does fit the case so neatly is no mean triumph for the validity, or at least 
the fertility, of Popper’s falsifiability criterion (which I continue to regard as 
one of the most important and fruitful ideas of our time); yet clearly it is not to 
be expected that the criterion is equally applicable, if at all, in historical cases 
where the issue was indeed the choice between two theories of equal scientific 
standing in the modern sense. Popper’s success in this respect also accounts for 
Kuhn’s failure: there needed not arise a crisis out of the senario, because the 
crisis that gave rise to the Scientific Revolution was of a much more general 
nature. As soon as the explanatory modes on which the senario implicitly 
rested were felt to be unsatisfactory, the implausibility of the senario itself 
became at once apparent. 
We have also seen that the new explanatory model that gained currency in 
the first decades of the seventeenth century, that of particles of matter in 
motion, in encompassing the coincidence theory as one of a great many 
applications of the model, ipso facto guarded this new theory against the 
“Thus I agree with Marxist critiques of the metatheories discussed here insofar as these 
metatheories are based on ‘an unargued assumption, namely, that there is a single, timeless, 
correct scientific method’ (A. F. Chalmers, W/W is this Thing culled Science? (Milton Keynes, 
1978). p. 141). But the approach suggested by Chalmers in order to draw the positive consequences 
from this point of view seems to me empty insofar as his introduction of the concept of ‘scientific 
practice’ is concerned (same book, IX and XI), and historically unreliab!e insofar as some 
particularly crude form of ‘historical materialism’ is invoked to do the job (XII). My appeal to the 
overall social setting does not imply any u priori view on what parts of it are the only relevant ones: 
this has to be discovered afresh for every specific case (as I have demonstrated in Quantifying 
Music, Section 7.2.). 
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falsification it so obviously seemed to deserve by its own merits. Here Kuhn’s 
metatheory turned out to provide more room for an explanation of our 
scientists’ behavior than Popper’s. This is so, I think, because Kuhn’s account 
of scientists’ reasons for deciding to choose one particular theory as the 
framework for their research in the future is much more historically oriented 
than Popper’s.” Popper tends, rather, to formalize these matters somewhat, 
looking for ‘degrees of verisimilitude’, and the like, as means towards a more 
objective basis for theory choice. But the degree of verisimilitude of the 
coincidence theory was very close to zero, hence objectively there should have 
been no reason for pursuing it further. The value of Popper’s formalisms is 
certainly made more relative by an appeal to the overall situation of science at 
the time in question; yet I do not think that such an element of historical 
relativism is entirely foreign to his overall model. After all, the history of 
science abounds with actual falsifications,26 and my only point here is that the 
question as to under what conditions these occur cannot be solved formally, 
but requires a mode of analysis that regards any given historical period as 
ultimately unique.*’ In this particular sense I do indeed believe that the 
philosophy and the history of science have much to contribute to each other. 
2JTh. S. Kuhn. op. cif. note 18, XII. 
‘6Kuhn doubts this (op. cif. note 18, p. 146); but just consider Kepler’s celebrated rejection of 
his own ‘hypothesis vicaria’for the orbit of ~Mars because of a difference of 8 min of arc between a 
predicted observation and the one actually made by Tycho. (This example is conspicuously absent 
from the historical treasures tapped by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.) 
*‘This statement is not intended as an expression of the belief that any given historical period is 
governed by one specific historical law; a belief that is combated so convincingly in K. R. Popper, 
The Poverty of Historicism (London, 1957). My point is that generalizations of cases of scientific 
progress should first be restricted to one definite period of time and duly linked to the overall 
situation of science in that period, before being generalized further. One example of such an 
approach is provided by N. J. Nersessian, Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific 
Theories (Den Haag, 1984). 
